There’s inherently some tension between: 1) High access to capital 2) High autonomy for talented teams to operate The bull case for MetaDAO, $META, & futarchy broadly is in solving that tradeoff. In the example below, the Pump team is incredibly talented, and they’ve built a great business. However, the market very reasonably continues to undervalue $PUMP relative to the fundamentals of that business. This will persist over the long-term if what Felipe is discussing isn’t addressed. Tokenholders don’t have any assurances that the current buybacks will continue or that they will benefit from the money earned and raised into Pump’s equity. So, $PUMP trades accordingly based on the market’s assessed probability of those happening. One way to increase the market’s assessed probability of value flowing back to the token is to conduct buybacks. Pump has notably moved to 100% buybacks. This can provide a credible signal to the market regarding the token’s potential value accrual. However, this is suboptimal capital allocation if you just raised money on the premise that more capital is needed to grow the business. It’s also suboptimal when the market doesn’t assign you full value for continuing them. The primary concern that founders (particularly very talented founders like the pump team) have about giving up any control to tokenholders is that it’ll slow them down and block them from shipping. The S-tier founders should be trusted to do what they think is best. And I mostly agree with that, but this is not binary. There’s an efficient frontier of providing very basic rights and protections to token/equity holders which will materially increase the value of that asset (and thus your ability to raise capital at attractive rates) while not materially slowing down operations. For example, you could use futarchy to govern only major capital allocation decisions. The core team can have a large budget to do with as they please and lead product development. But if they want to empty the treasury, send buybacks to 0%, or just issue new tokens and give them to the team (like $BELIEVE) they will need to show some argument to the market why this isn’t just a clear rug of the token. One great idea from the MetaDAO team (which I hope to see implemented soon) is that you can even set negative thresholds on team-led proposals (e.g., this proposal made by the founder passes unless the decision market says it will have > -5% impact on token price), such that the default is proposals pass. Then proposals only fail when the market deems them to be clearly negative for the token. You trust the founder who has asymmetric information and talent relative to the market, while providing tokenholders a safety net from clearly terrible decisions. There’s a spectrum here of staying fully private (allowing for high team control) and going fully public (allowing for access to more capital). But you can’t get the best of both without any sacrifices at all. Fortunately, I think there are some very high leverage small sacrifices which can provide very high upside. This is how TradFi works for a reason, and it's what providing basic tokenholder protections such as via futarchy can do even better. This is one of the most important problems to solve in crypto today. Whoever cracks it will become one of the most impactful and successful products to ever come out our industry.